Representing the Foreign: Exoticism, Ideology, and Reality

Introduction

In a recent study of French literature dealing with colonial Indochina, Henri Copin writes:

How can we specify the field covered by the notion of colonial literature? First by defining its ties to the colonial idea. What is here the sense of the adjective "colonial," of what echoes is it the carrier, what charges, what missions does it imply? To define colonial literature is first of all to specify its relationship to ideology.

Next, it implies identifying the relations of colonial literature to what was then called exoticism. Their common vocation is to deal with an elsewhere, outside of Europe. Most often, however, they are seen as opposed. Exoticism becomes a defect to be avoided, a vestige of a past that is finished, outmoded, pernicious. In order to exist, colonial literature must first disengage itself from exoticism. Why? How?

Finally, it is asserted that colonial literature must take account of the real. But of what real? How can one identify it? Through what themes, by what means can it be reconstituted?

... Its relationships to ideology, to exoticism, and to the real, then, constitute three determinations of colonial literature and provide an interpretive framework for whoever today wishes to read any colonial novel, any travel narrative, any essay in a context that clarifies them (Copin 1996:14-15: my translation).

Although Copin defined these three axes of ideology, exoticism, and reality specifically in order to help make sense of colonial literature, I find them to be a useful interpretive framework for clarifying representations of "the foreign" in general. In this essay I will introduce my own definitions of these terms, referring to selected recent literature, and suggest how they can form the basis for a general theoretical approach to representation of the foreign. Much critical attention has
been given to representation in scientific and scholarly literature, especially in anthropology, to which I make some references; here, however, I am mainly concerned with representation in art and entertainment1 genres (songs, novels, poems, paintings, fictional films, etc.) in modern capitalist societies. I intend to use Copin’s three terms not in the evaluative tone that he has observed in literary criticism (where exoticism, for example, is seen as "pernicious"), but rather as neutral analytical terms to denote interrelated but distinct dimensions of representation and interpretetion. Examples illustrating theoretical points will be drawn from a number of different areas, but especially from my own research on Japanese popular music of the wartime period (1931–45).

I. Exoticism

Perhaps the most problematic of Copin’s three dimensions, if one wishes to use it as a neutral category of analysis, is exoticism. In anthropology and related fields, as in Copin’s field of colonial literature studies, exoticism is widely seen as "pernicious" wherever it occurs, and it is most emphatically seen as "a defect to be avoided" in scholarly work itself. Indeed, exoticism appears at times as the "Other" of researchers in cross-cultural fields: it is the thing in contrast to which scholars must define their own identities, the thing that one’s own field of study is not. Thus Marcus and Fischer write:

Anthropology is not the mindless collection of the exotic, but the use of cultural richness for self-reflection and self-growth. To accomplish this in the modern world of increased interdependence among societies and mutual awareness among cultures requires new styles of sensibility and of writing. Such exploration in anthropology lies in the move from a simple interest in the description of cultural others to a more balanced purpose of cultural critique which plays off other cultural realities against our own in order to gain a more adequate knowledge of them all. (1986: ix–x)

In contrast to "the mindless collection of the exotic," anthropology is defined to be "the use of cultural richness for self-reflection and self-growth." In the modern world, at least, a "simple interest in the description of cultural others" is inadequate as a mission for anthropology, and anthropologists must therefore move away from this approach toward one that emphasizes cultural critique. An outmoded concern for mere description is thus implicitly equated with exoticism, and the imperative for anthropology, it would seem, is to be something other than exoticism. But the boundary between the two remains rather unclear. When exactly is the "collection of the exotic" to be considered "mindless"? (When it is done by non-anthropologists?) If anthropology is simply "the use of cultural richness for self-reflection and self-growth," then isn’t there every reason to believe

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1 The distinction between "art" and "entertainment" depends upon notions of aesthetic value, and need not concern us here.
that it has been practiced by vast numbers of people (travelers, traders, diplomats, etc.) for centuries, and by still larger numbers of ordinary people "in the modern world of increased interdependence among societies and mutual awareness among cultures"? Is the issue simply that anthropology is now threatened by the ubiquity of non-scholarly sources of knowledge about cultural diversity? In fairness, the authors are at this point simply introducing a central problem to be addressed by their book - namely, what is a suitable role for anthropology in the modern world? - without claiming to provide a definitive solution. But my point is that here, where the authors suggest the outline of a solution, what they appear to suggest is a rather uneasy effort to distance anthropology from exoticism.

In other cases "exoticism" becomes a contemptuous label to slap on some Other scholarly field that the author wishes to put at a distance. Thus a well-known popular music theorist has delivered the following comments regarding the lack of attention paid by ethnomusicologists to popular music:

In practice...most ethnomusicologists study the music of 'primitive' societies, of the oriental high cultures and of 'folk' cultures; popular music, let alone Western 'art' music, has hardly been touched... This is partly because other disciplines have been perceived as attending or likely to attend to them, and it is partly because methods and attitudes developed early in ethnomusicology's life are not easily given up: but mostly it seems to be yet another result of the colonial quest of the Western bourgeoisie, bent on preserving other people's musics before they disappear, documenting 'survivals' of 'traditional' practices, and enjoying the pleasures of exoticism into the bargain. (Middleton 1990:146)

The word "primitive," with quotation marks, sets up the indictment of ethnomusicologists by implying that they are likely to apply this sort of term to non-Western societies. (In fact the concept of "primitive society" had been rejected by virtually all ethnomusicologists long before 1990, when Middleton's book appeared.) Some possible reasons are mentioned for ethnomusicologists' presumed neglect of popular music (which had also begun to be rectified by 1990), but the main reason, we are told, has to do with "the colonial quest of the Western bourgeoisie." Finally, the accusation that ethnomusicologists "enjoy the pleasures of exoticism" serves to damn them conclusively as bourgeois colonialists. Here "exoticism" clearly denotes not only "description of the foreign" (as in Marcus and Fisher) but also "pleasure in the foreign," and such pleasure is explicitly linked to colonialism.

These two examples may suffice to illustrate recent uses of the words "exoticism" or "exotic" with reference to academic endeavors: exoticism is mindless collection or bourgeois pleasure. trivial at best, and at worst positively sinister in its complicity with colonialism; it is something to avoid in one's own field, or to condemn in someone else's. Such concerns about exoticism in academia have probably increased during the last two decades as a result of the widespread influence of
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Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1979). Although the word "exoticism" rarely appears in Said's book, it has absorbed some of the sense and feeling of his "Orientalism": "a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient" (p.3). Many academic writers have become sensitive to the possibility that their predecessors, their colleagues, or they themselves might be participating in such dominating and restructuring. It may be, as Marcus and Fisher argue, that this new sensitivity and the soul-searching that it inspires have helped to bring on a fruitful period of experimentation in anthropology. But Said's polemic against Orientalism has also, I think, charged the atmosphere surrounding "exoticism" and led to an unfortunate degree of anxiety toward anything that smacks of it in academic writing. Part of the anxiety may derive from uncertainty as to what exactly constitutes exoticism. Most writers agree that it has something to do with cross-cultural representation or interaction, but definitions are not consistent (as we will see), and in any case exoticism is condemned more often than defined.

"Exoticism" in non-academic cultural products, similarly, gets a great deal of bad press from the academy. Savigliano, for example, has the following to say about exoticism in a recent book on the colonial and post-colonial history and cultural significance of tango dancing:

Exoticism is a way of establishing order in an unknown world through fantasy; a daydream guided by pleasurable self-reassurance and expansionism. It is the seemingly harmless side of exploitation, cloaked as it is in playfulness and delirium; a legitimate practice of discrimination, where otherwise secretive fantasies can be shared aloud. Exoticism is a practice of representation through which identities are frivolously allocated. It is also a will to power over the unknown, an act of indiscriminately combining fragments, crumbs of knowledge and fantasy, in disrespectful, sweeping gestures justified by harmless banality. (1995: 169)

It is not clear whether this is meant to be a definition of exoticism, a denunciation of it, or both at once. In any case the salient features of the writer's conception of exoticism are clear. The operative words and phrases form a catalog of these features: "fantasy," "pleasurable," "seemingly harmless," "exploitation," "playfulness," "delirium," "frivolously," "will to power over the unknown," "indiscriminately," "disrespectful," "banality." Exoticism, in short, is frivolity and banality on the surface, exploitation and the will to power at a deeper level.

Even when the term is not used as a pejorative, exoticism is often assumed or implicitly defined to be something that arises from the West, or from Western colonialism and its aftermath. Thus Celestin (1996: 5) in a thoughtful and well-argued book, notes the established use of the term "exoticism" to denote a particular trend in 19th century European literature, but states that he will use it "as an analytical tool to explore a more generic practice: the representation of the foreign in Western and postcolonial literature." (Along with four Western writers Celestin discusses V.S. Naipaul, who is non-Western but post-colonial.) In extreme cases, exoticism is taken to be synonymous with any Western representation of the non-West. Thus Bohrer (1996: 295) quite casually be-
gins a sentence: "Exoticism (which I use here as a general term for European reference to non-European cultures) ..." He then proceeds to focus his discussion on writers and artists such as Flaubert, Delacroix, and Loti, whom he characterizes as "exoticists," apparently forgetting that by his definition nearly every European (at least, every one who has at some time made a reference to a non-European culture) is an exoticist. He also does not comment on the numerous instances of exoticism, i.e., references to non-European cultures, in his own essay. Bohrer's definition thus includes a great deal that he himself would not actually call exoticism; but it also excludes a great deal (non-European representations of the attractively foreign) that most people probably would call exoticism.

In other cases, an author acknowledges at least the theoretical possibility that exoticism can appear in non-Western cultures, but offers reasons for narrowing the focus to Western (and specifically Western imperialist) experiences and productions. In relation to an author's personal choice of research topic, such reasons cannot be criticized: but if construed as general arguments for a greater attention to Western than to non-Western exoticism, they are unconvincing. Thus, for example, Savigliano writes:

[Exoticism] is the key to the Western constitution of the Other — since the West has constituted the Other, with a capital 'O,' through worldwide imperialism. I am not saying that only the West has exoticized and configured Otherness. I am saying that only the West has had the power to make its discourse of the Other come true globally — that the West alone has been successful in imposing worldwide exoticization on its Others. Thus, Western imperialism is what I am interested in. (Savigliano 1995: 9)

Without criticizing Savigliano's reasons for her own interest in Western imperialism and exoticism, I would argue that in general the fact that only Western exoticism has achieved global diffusion and influence does not imply that Western exoticism is more deserving of careful study than any other exoticism. Certainly no anthropologist or ethnomusicologist would make such an assertion if the topic were not "Western exoticism" but rather "Western music" or "Western political systems." Western exoticism is, to be sure, unique among exoticisms in the degree to which it has influenced the ways in which people all over the world perceive and represent themselves and one another. This does not, however, justify a lack of interest in non-Western exoticism. On the contrary, it suggests that the exoticisms of different cultures need to be studied and compared, so that

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1 Here as elsewhere, "the West" is of course not really a single unit. The diversity of representation practices includes diversity among Western exporters of exoticism, such as France, Britain and the United States. It also includes the exoticization of Western countries: Spain and Italy, for example, have probably been exoticized as much as any countries in history, and by both Western and non-Western exoticizers.
the diversity and the historical development of representation practices, including the influence of Western exoticism on non-Western practices, can be properly understood. Even where the influence of Western exoticism has been very strong in the non-West, it has not been simply "imposed," but rather responded to and adapted to by people with particular interests, goals, and cultural resources. Their productions and discourses deserve as much attention as those of the West.

As in the quoted passages from Middleton and Savigliano, "exoticism" or "exoticization" is often assumed to be a product of imperialism, colonialism, or other cultural domination. This connection is often implicit even in the rare cases where non-Western exoticism is mentioned. Thus French literary critic Denis Lombard writes:

Although our manuals do not dwell on it much, the place held by exotic fiction, that is by that which takes other cultures as its object, in our Western literatures is quite considerable. It is positively exorbitant when one considers the place allotted to it by other literatures of the world; Indian texts have remained, as we know, quite laconic regarding the "Indianization" of the rest of Asia, even if the Ramayana can be seen in a sense as a gigantic story of the acculturation of savages, and if the Chinese showed early on a certain curiosity toward the "barbarians" of their periphery, the Japanese were able, from the end of the 19th century, to construct their grand Asian empire without the slightest literary effusion. The closest to us appear to be the Arabs, whose Thousand and One Nights, and the adventures of Sindbad, are in everyone's heads; but still we should note, with Andre Miquel, that these works have had little success in the Muslim world and that it is precisely the Europeans who have created their celebrity. (Lombard 1993:11 : my translation)

In fact, the Japanese effusion of colonial and exotic literature from the 1910s to the 1940s was hardly insignificant (a recently published selection of such literature fills twenty volumes; see Yamashita 1998-2001): and although I am not qualified to pass judgment on the topic with regard to India, China, or the Arab world, I rather suspect that those literatures may not be getting their due either. Be that as it may, Lombard's remarks are notable in that his definition of exoticism is theoretically applicable to the literary productions of any culture: "that which takes other cultures as its object." In his subsequent examples, however, he implicitly limits this definition: the examples all involve center-periphery or dominating-dominated relationships between the culture doing the writing and the culture being written about. Arab, Indian, Chinese or Japanese writings about one another, about distant places beyond their "peripheries," or about Western cultures are not

3 As one of several definitions of "exotic," for example, The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) gives "having the attraction of the strange or foreign." I have never seen a dictionary definition of "exotic" or "exoticism," or of their cognates in French and Japanese, that restricts its meaning to Western or imperialist experience and production.
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mentioned. Lombard appears to assume, in defiance of his own broad definition, that exoticism can arise only when a powerful or dominant culture looks at a dominated or peripheral one.

These prevailing tendencies to see exoticism as wicked or contemptible, strictly Western, and/or imperialist have made it rather difficult to use the term in a neutral way, to describe an area of human experience or cultural production that could theoretically occur in any culture, under any set of power relations. That is, however, the way in which I propose to use it. I define exoticism simply as "pleasure in the foreign," when used with regard to human experience, and as "symbolic forms or objects that evoke, or are intended to evoke, pleasure in the foreign" when used with regard to cultural products. I think "pleasure in the foreign" is close to the common (non-academic) use of the word, as well as to many dictionary definitions. But I do not share Middleton's contempt for such pleasure: in my view there is nothing wrong with taking pleasure in the foreign, and nor academics nor anyone else needs to feel guilty about it. Virtually all scholars involved in cross-cultural research do indeed take pleasure in the foreignness of what they study, and in the process by which the foreign gradually becomes familiar: if they did not, they would surely be engaged in some other line of work. Exoticism is by no means opposed to recognition of a common humanity shared with people of other cultures: pleasure in what is different can, on the contrary, also heighten awareness of (and pleasure in) what is not different, and can help lead to rich and fulfilling personal relationships across cultural boundaries. Exoticism is, I think, often what initially draws people into a serious interest in and respect for cultures other than their own, and it thus becomes the starting point for a great deal of cross-cultural understanding. It is also, to be sure, involved in much cross-cultural condescension, exploitation, and outright imperialist propaganda. Exoticism, i.e. pleasure in the foreign, is a common if not universal aspect of cultural contact. It both generates cultural contact and is generated by it, and it is as diverse in its manifestations and effects as the circumstances under which people of different cultures directly or indirectly encounter one another. To condemn it or dismiss it with contempt from the outset is to lose any hope of really understanding it.

The "foreign" of "pleasure in the foreign" is of course a relative term: foreign from the point of view of someone, or some group of people. I use the term to denote the subjective impression or sensation of foreignness, rather than any objective foreign origin or quality. Thus to most Japanese and Americans in the year 2001, a Western-style dress made in China is not felt to be exotic: a dress made in Tokyo or New York that looks "Chinese" is. The exotic is not simply the foreign, but that which evokes an idea of foreignness and an associated positive affect: it is something that

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1 The term "exotic" is still used in biological sciences in an objective sense to refer to something introduced from a foreign place, e.g. an exotic plant species. It was formerly used in a similar way in comparative musicology as well, as in E.M. von Hornbostel's "Suggested Methods for the Transcription of Exotic Music" (reprinted in Ethnomusicology 38 (3): 425-56). In contemporary usage, however, this sense of the term with reference to cultural objects seems to have largely disappeared.
conveys or embodies a pleasurable feeling of foreignness, regardless of what objective connections may exist between the "something" and actual foreign cultures or places.¹

By "pleasure" I mean any positive affective response, including attraction, fascination, admiration, aesthetic reverie, etc. evoked in part by the perceived foreignness of an object (or of the place, people, or culture that an object represents). According to this definition, what I would call sharply negative affective responses toward the foreign (hatred, fear, revulsion, anger, disgust, contempt, dumbfounded incomprehension, etc.) and objects that evoke them are not exoticism (or at least not effective exoticism). There is a rather gray area that includes the fascination of the grotesque or horrid, and the appeal of sadness or pathos associated with foreign places: these I will generally consider to be forms of exoticism. Some wartime Japanese songs, for example, depict the cold desolation of the Manchurian landscape and the loneliness or homesickness of Japanese soldiers stationed there. This is pleasure in the foreign in a broad sense: these songs drew their potency from the reality of thousands of soldiers separated from their families and their homes and, like any sad songs, gave pleasure even while evoking tears.

A feeling of foreignness is rarely if ever the only thing that makes an exotic object attractive, but the particular attraction or appeal of foreignness is what makes exoticism distinct. I intend to exclude from my definition pleasure in that which is "foreign" in some objective sense, but which is not perceived as foreign, or in which the perceived foreignness of the object is not a source of pleasure. Thus a Japanese person who enjoys Western classical music is not by definition engaging in exoticism: she is doing so only if the music conveys a feeling of foreignness to her that is part of what she enjoys about it.

An exotic signifier signifies both a concept (the concept of a foreign place, people, culture, or object, or of "foreignness" generally) and an affect (a positive affect associated with the concept). Especially because of this affective component, what functions as exoticism and what does not depends to a considerable extent on individual differences and on context. Thus an ordinary political map of China in a U.S. atlas is not usually a piece of exoticism, but for certain people at certain times it may evoke exotic feelings. The same map becomes definitely an exotic signifier when it appears to the sound of a gong crash at the beginning of an adventure movie. The word "China," similarly, may or may not be felt as exotic, depending upon whether it appears in a popular song full of "Chinese" melodies or in a table of economic data. The "Chinese" melodies, on the other hand, may or may not fulfill their intended exotic function, depending on whether the listener is competent in the musical "code" by which those melodies signify China. It may at times be useful to distinguish between "sender-exoticism" (that in which the producer of a symbolic representation intended for it to be experienced as exoticism) and "receiver-exoticism" (that in which the consumer/listener/viewer of the representation experiences it as exoticism). Most Japanese wartime exoticism was both produced and received as such, but there are some exceptions: the songs "Hourii chun Shairai" and "Bungawan Solo," for example, were originally written as non-exotic pieces by Chinese and Indonesian songwriters, respectively, then arranged and released as exoticism in Ja-
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For a general approach to the study of exoticism, a few more terms and distinctions may be useful. An exotic product involves two cultures, countries, or places: that of the audience or intended audience of the exotic product, and that of the object represented. We can call these the subject country and the object country (or object city, region, culture, etc. as the case may be). Usually there is an existing real-world country corresponding to the object country imagined through the exotic representation, although in general this need not be the case (it may be a country of the past, or a wholly imaginary one). When necessary the following form can be used to clarify the two countries involved: "U.S. China-exoticism" refers to exotic representations of China made for U.S. audiences, "Japanese China-exoticism" refers to exotic representations of China made for Japanese audiences, and so on.

Imported exoticism refers to products or representations created as exoticism for one subject country, then disseminated to audiences of another subject country. For example, Japanese China-exoticism of the wartime period (popular music depicting China) was influenced by imported U.S. and European China-exoticism (especially Western songs and film music depicting China).

When a country imports exoticism of which it is itself the object (e.g. U.S. Japan-exoticism imported to Japan), or when a particular subculture within a country is the object of exoticism that is then disseminated to members of that same subculture, then "subject" and "object" may overlap, producing what we might call exoticism feedback, i.e. a situation in which people become members of the audience for the exoticization of their own culture. Examples include people in Okinawa listening to pop versions of Okinawan music produced by non-Okinawans in Tokyo; Spanish people attending a performance of Bizet's Carmen, an opera with a Spanish setting by a French composer; Japanese people attending a performance of Puccini's Madame Butterfly; or African-Americans in the 19th century hearing the songs and banjo playing of (white) blackface minstrel show performers. In these cases, some of the people receiving the exotic feedback may find it insulting, but some may just as well find it amusing, interesting or otherwise enjoyable, perhaps even as a source of exotic pleasure with the subject and object countries reversed (i.e. Puccini may well function as Italy-exoticism for many Japanese). For some, it may be a source of new ideas for their own cultural production, as certainly did happen in the case of African-American musicians influenced by minstrel show music. Such cases, in which artists are influenced by the exoticization of their own culture, are sometimes called "self-exoticization," but this term should properly be applied, I think, only where the goal is a product that will have exotic appeal to cultural outsiders. A cultural product that is influenced by exoticism is not necessarily a piece of exoticism itself: it may borrow elements from an exotic product but then use them in such a way that they lose their exotic signification.

Generic exoticism refers to exotic signifiers that are used not to signify a specific country or place, but to evoke a generalized feeling of "foreignness" that can be applied to a range of geographic referents. In prewar U.S. popular music a classic case was the tango genre, which signified
exotic feeling but not necessarily Argentina, as we can see for example in the 1916 jazz tango "Egyptian Fantasy" (Roberts 1979: 49). In Japanese wartime songs about China there were numerous examples of musical elements drawn from tango or rumba that appear to be used as generic exoticism: separated from any association with their countries of origin (Argentina or Cuba), these elements are used to add a generic exotic flavor to representations of China.

II. Ideology.

Like "exoticism," "ideology" is a term whose frequent use as a pejorative has rendered it difficult to use in a neutral sense. The Collins English Dictionary (1995) gives the following as its first two definitions: "1. A body of ideas that reflects the beliefs and interests of a nation, political system, etc. and underlies political action. 2. Philosophy, sociology. The set of beliefs by which a group or society orders reality so as to render it intelligible." Both of these are reasonably neutral, non-evaluative definitions, and we might note that the first definition represents a subset or special case of the second. Geertz notes that the term once meant simply "a collection of political proposals" (which is fairly close to definition 1) but has come to imply a set of ideas fraught with bias, distortion, and rigid dogmatism; these implications, he points out, remain even in the works of many social scientists who have sought to give the term a clear and impartial definition (1973 : 193-6). There is thus a question "whether or not having become an accusation, it can remain an analytic concept"(194).

In Marxist discourse, ideology originally meant a system of ideas associated with power, i.e. used for the maintenance of power by a dominant group or for revolutionary purposes by an oppressed group: this is basically a non-evaluative definition, and Marxists could speak of themselves as well as their enemies as having ideologies. Some Marxist-influenced writers, however, such as Gramsci and Foucault, have emphasized the subtle and pervasive use of ideology by a dominant ("hegemonic") group to maintain power, and as a result "ideology" has tended once again to become a pejorative: writers in the Gramscian and Foucauldian tradition do not generally speak of themselves as having ideologies.

As in the case of exoticism, I propose that "ideology" is likely to be of more use to scholars as an analytic concept than as an accusation. In this I concur with Geertz, whose remarks about ideology could be applied to exoticism as well:

Discussions of sociopolitical ideas that indict them ab initio, in terms of the very words used to name them, as deformed or worse, merely beg the questions they pretend to raise. It is also possible, of course, that the term "ideology" should simply be dropped from scientific discourse altogether and left to its polemical fate — as "superstition" in fact has been. But, as there seems to be nothing at the moment with which to replace it and as it is at least partially established in the technical lexicon of the social sciences, it seems more advisable to proceed with the effort to defuse it. (1973 : 200)
Geertz proves his sincerity in this effort by freely admitting that he himself has an ideology (1973: 200 note). Indeed, I would argue that ideology, even more than exoticism, is a constant part of virtually everyone's experience, and certainly a part of every scholar's writing. By ideology I mean, most generally, something like Collins's second definition: any explicit set of ideas according to which people interpret and make sense out of the world ("explicit" in the sense that someone who holds those ideas is conscious of them and can express them through words or other symbols). Such ideas are not necessarily rigid and dogmatic: in some cases they may be quite flexible and may constantly or periodically undergo modification under the pressure of new information, social forces, and so on.

In this sense scientific theories are one form of ideology: they define the form in which new information from the world is to be gathered and provide an interpretive framework for that information. Like other kinds of ideology, they may be quite rigid or quite flexible, depending upon scientists and their circumstances. Even in the face of information that they cannot adequately interpret, scientific theories often resist change for periods of time because of the sociopolitical positions of scientists or their personal vested interests in certain theories. But when theories do change, as

5 Khun, somewhat to his consternation, has often been misinterpreted as claiming that the historical development of scientific ideas is a purely socio-political matter and that no scientific theory is better than any other. In fact he is quite clear that scientific theories arise and change through a combination of experimental results and social processes. While he does explicitly avoid the view that science is developing toward a goal of perfect and complete objective description of nature (1970: 170–1), he also asserts that science has achieved a level of progress, as well as a scarcity of competing schools, that distinguishes it from non-scientific fields (209). By "progress" he means that later scientific theories are generally better than earlier ones in the degree to which they enable scientists to "set up and solve puzzles presented by nature" and to make accurate quantitative predictions. He does not conclude from this that later theories provide "a better representation of what nature is really like," because there is no theory-free way to conceive a correspondence between a theory and some "real" entity in nature that might correspond to the theory (205–6). This position, he asserts, is not relativistic, and I agree with him.

6 While I do not believe any theory can be "absolutely" true, I believe that some theories about the physical world are more true to reality than others, and that this is why they provide for better prediction. In this I differ somewhat from Khun. The Copernican theory, I think it is fair to say, made possible (generally) more accurate prediction of astronomical events because the planets really do revolve around the sun, not the earth. To say that this theory is only a mental model to which reality is irrelevant would be like saying that my belief in the reality of other conscious human beings, or in the floor under my feet, is only a mental model. Philosophically such a position can be defended, but it leads only to solipsism if applied consistently, or to self-contradictory nonsense if applied inconsistently.
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Thomas Knun (1970) argues, the values of scientific communities are such that they usually change in the direction of new theories that provide for a broader range of problem-solving and greater accuracy of prediction. Among ideological as opposed to exotic representations of the foreign, then, one would have to include scientific representations. Exactly which fields should be called "sciences" is of course a thorny issue, but even among the relatively uncontroversial physical and biological sciences, there are many—geology, meteorology, botany and zoology, to name a few—that involve representation of the foreign in a broad sense. (Coconut palms on Pacific islands can be a matter of either botanical significance or exotic charm, depending on the context.) In anthropology and other social sciences, cultural relativism is an ideology (one to which I myself generally subscribe) that has been criticized in recent years, but that continues to provide a widely-used framework for the interpretation of cultural difference.

By including scientific theories and research paradigms under the general category of "ideology" I do not intend to demean the value of those theories or to suggest that scientific theories have no relation to truth. I do mean that as sets of ideas through which people make sense of reality they are similar to, and interact with, ideologies of other kinds. One example of such an interaction is the long history of conflicts and compromises between scientific and religious ideologies regarding the geography of the earth and the structure of the universe; another is the transformation of the biological theory of evolution (which has in fact led to greater problem-solving and predictive capacity) into evolutionist theories of human society (which in general have not). Another example might be the influence of anthropologys's cultural relativism on the emergence of "multiculturalism" as a social and political ideology and as a popular culture phenomenon (manifested in "World Music" sections of record stores and in United Colors of Benetton advertisements).

To some degree the "scientific" values (emphasis on problem-solving and accurate prediction as criteria for the acceptance of an ideology) can be said to distinguish scientific ideologies from other kinds. But these values also influence in varying degrees the acceptance or rejection of other types of ideologies by groups of people and individuals. Social, political, and psychological factors may produce pressure to maintain a certain ideology, to change aspects of it, or to adopt a wholly new one; but other pressures arise from the need to solve problems and to make accurate predictions in one's interactions with reality. A religious ideology that predicts the end of the world on a certain date will at least require some modification when that date passes and the world has not ended. One's very perceptions of reality are of course partially shaped and filtered by one's pre-existing ideologies, but only partially. (If our perceptions were totally shaped so as to fit our pre-existing ideas, then such everyday occurrences as learning and unexpected events would be impossible.) Thus ideologies both shape and are shaped by people's interactions with the real world. This is not to say that all ideologies are equally good, either as representations of reality or as bases for social or political action. As Geertz puts it, "The demand for a nonevaluative concept of ideology is not a demand for the nonevaluation of ideologies, any more than a nonevaluative concept of religion implies religious relativism" (1973:200 note).
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Ideologies, as explicit systems of ideas shared (in more or less similar form) by groups of people, form part of the cognitive makeup of individuals (only part, since people have a great deal in their cognitive makeup that they cannot explicitly state). As the cognitive and the affective are in general closely linked (although still, I think, analytically distinguishable), ideologies and their associated symbols are typically connected to sets of affective responses. This is true even of the more "intellectual" sorts of ideologies: a scientist, for example, feels excitement upon reading about a new theory, and later feel disappointment upon encountering evidence that contradicts it. But affect plays an especially important role in political or social ideologies consciously formulated and propagated by governments or other groups — ideologies in the narrower sense of Collins's first definition. In these cases the propagation of systems of ideas, primarily through verbal signs, is reinforced through affective responses evoked by a combination of verbal and nonverbal signs. Thus a government promoting a nationalist ideology not only formulates nationalist ideas in verbal form, but also uses verbal devices such as metaphor to invest those ideas with emotion ("our nation is a family, and the emperor is our father," for example). Aural and visual symbols are also powerful signifiers of the affect that accompanies ideology, so that a nationalist feels a surge of pride on hearing the national anthem, and anger on seeing someone burn his country's flag on the television news.

Political and social ideologies promoted by governments often provide simple sets of categories for classifying (and representing) foreign countries. Thus during the Cold War, the ideology of the U.S. government generally divided the countries of the world into "free" (i.e. capitalist), "communist," and "Third World" groups, each with their associated emotional and policy connotations (free = good; communist = evil; Third World = in need of U.S. assistance and protection). In wartime Japan, the dominant government ideology (which also imparts meaning to the foreign in many wartime songs) was a nationalist and imperialist ideology that sought to justify Japanese domination over other Asian countries. In effect, this ideology divided the countries and political entities of the world into six distinct categories: 1) Japan itself; 2) enemies of Japan (Chiang Kai-shek and the nationalist Chinese; later, Britain and the U.S.); 3) allies of Japan (Germany and Italy); 4) Japanese colonies or occupied areas; 5) colonies or occupied areas of Japan's enemies; and 6) neutral countries. (In addition, official racial ideology assigned other categories that crosscut these political categories.) Each of these ideological categories had its manifestations in government policies toward music and/or in the representations of different countries in popular songs. Thus, during the Pacific War, German and Italian music was encouraged and tango (from neutral Argentina) was tolerated, while American jazz, condemned for its corrupting moral effects, was banned. Like many other nationalist ideologies (including that of the Cold War U.S.), this one includes the category of an "evil foreign" as a kind of anti-exoticism, which inspires efforts to protect the Home country from its supposed malevolent influences.

7 See also Geertz 1973:208-10 on the ideological use of metaphor and other verbal devices.
III. Reality

Reality, Copin's third axis, presents difficulties of a different order from exoticism and ideology. Defining "reality" is a problem for metaphysics and ontology, and I will not attempt to address it here, except to reiterate that I believe there is an external reality that interacts with our sensory apparatus and partially shapes our ideologies and other cognitive structures. Whatever reality may "be," it will suffice in the present context to point out that the makers of songs, movies, books, pictures, scholarly papers, and other representations of the foreign are influenced in varying degrees by their beliefs about the realities of the places they depict, and by what they believe to be their audience's beliefs about those realities.

Although it is occasionally asserted that reality is simply irrelevant to "exoticism," I think there is little reasonable doubt that it plays a major role at least in scientific and information-oriented genres of representation. Although international news reporters, for example, are undoubtedly influenced in their reporting and in their selection of material by considerations of exoticism and ideology, they are also undoubtedly concerned within some framework to represent accurately what they believe to be reality, if only because they do not want to be caught in a falsehood by a rival news agency. The give and take between ideology and reality is central to the development of scientific ideologies, as discussed earlier: current ideologies (theories) define the form in which information about reality is gathered, and that information (together with social, political, and other pressures) contributes to the reinforcement, modification, or wholesale rejection of ideologies by scientists.

Even in representations whose aim is more aesthetic than informational, I think reality and beliefs about reality are relevant in at least three ways. First, representations of the foreign are always constructed against a background of real relationships and interactions between countries, and this background defines much of what is possible in their form and content. Interactions of all kinds between Japan and China, for example, increased dramatically during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as a result of which Japanese came to know far more about China (and Chinese far more about Japan) than ever before: this knowledge gave shape to an explosion of "continental" exoticism in 1930s Japan, and indeed made it possible. The realities of Japan's imperialist project, of comings and goings of Japanese to and from the continent, of what they experienced there, are all part of this background. Chinese music heard by Japanese composers of the 1930s during visits to China, for example, is a component of reality (filtered, of course, through their own consciousnesses) that those composers drew upon in their musical representations of China.

Second, culture producers may be motivated by the goal or the perceived necessity of representing reality truthfully, just as they are motivated to incorporate exoticism and/or ideology into their work. Certain elements, regardless of whether they actually do correspond to realities of the

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country represented, may be included partly because of the producer’s belief in such a correspondence. The product finally may depend not only on the producer’s desire to convey an exotic effect and/or an ideological message, but also on the producer’s beliefs about the reality of the object country and intention to convey something of that reality, or at least to avoid grossly misrepresenting it. This intention may be based on ethical considerations or on purely practical ones. An example of the latter, in which reality is perceived as a practical constraint on the use of exoticism, is found in a 1921 book for leaders of silent-film orchestras in the U.S.: “Never introduce a Japanese picture by playing an Egyptian serenade, for there will surely be a son of Nippon, grinding his teeth, somewhere in the audience.” The danger of such “exoticism feedback” increases with the growth of international cultural commerce, and increases the pressure on culture producers to take account of reality in representing the foreign: they do not want to offend any part of their audience if they can help it.

Third and finally, the effectiveness of exoticism or of ideology in representations may depend upon the belief by consumers that what they see or hear represents reality truthfully, and this belief may be manipulated by the producers of culture. Thus the actress and singer Rikoran (born Yamaguchi Yoshiko, to Japanese parents in Manchuria) was falsely presented as Chinese to the wartime Japanese public because her effectiveness as a vehicle for both exoticism and ideology (“Japan-China friendship”) depended on the audience’s belief that she was Chinese. Thus in their efforts to gain the desired effect on an audience (for purposes of ideology or exoticism), culture producers may be find it convenient to reveal, conceal, or ignore reality, depending upon the circumstances.

IV. The Dynamics of Exoticism and Ideology

While reality, then, forms a broad background, a set of constraints, and an effect to be manipulated in aesthetic representations, reality takes second place to ideology and exoticism in many if not most fictional books, movies, songs, and other cultural products in which the foreign is represented. Exoticism, to recapitulate, is a feeling of attraction to or pleasure in the foreign, connected to any of a range of ideas (possibly vague and disorganized) about foreign places and peoples. An ideology, on the other hand, is a relatively organized set of ideas, which are often connected to certain kinds of feelings that support the propagation and maintenance of those ideas. What can we say about the connections between exoticism and that subset of ideology that deals with foreign places and peoples?

In my view exoticism and ideology derive from opposite but complementary impulses: the urge to absorb the foreign into a familiar, pre-existing conceptual framework (ideology), and the attraction of the unfamiliar, of what lies outside of any familiar framework (exoticism). Many writers on exoticism have introduced similar pairs of terms, and have commented on the tension between the familiar/ideological and the unfamiliar/exotic. Bongie (1991) distinguishes between “imperialist” and “exoticizing” exoticism in 19th century European literature: the former seeks to conquer and
impose Western order on the world, while the latter sees the unconquered places and people as a hope of salvation for the individual who is disillusioned with the corrupted West. "Whereas imperialist exoticism affirms the hegemony of modern civilization over less developed, savage territories, exoticizing exoticism privileges those very territories and their peoples, figuring them as a possible refuge from an overbearing modernity," (Bongie 1991: 17). Celestin (1996: 5-6), similarly, sees the representation of otherness in Western exotic texts as contained between two extremes: "exemplification" (the incorporation of the Other into a system, into the structures of knowledge of the Home, which in the extreme leads to the "disappearance" both of the Other and of the Western subject/writer); and "experimentation" (the tendency of the individual Western subject to "sever ties with home," to find in the exotic the means of strengthening his own individuality and independence of the dominant discourses of Home). I concur with these writers in seeing representation of the foreign as depending largely upon the tensions and interactions between these two impulses, which I will continue to refer to as ideology and exoticism.

The interactions of ideology and exoticism can also be partially mapped onto those of the familiar and the foreign. The pleasure of the foreign, as is often pointed out, requires a balance between the foreign and the familiar: if an exotic object is too radically different from what its audience knows, it is incomprehensible: if it is too familiar, on the other hand, it loses its exotic attraction. As exoticism negotiates the middle ground between these extremes, it often makes use of what might be called the "familiarly foreign:" elements that are familiar as signifiers of the foreign, but (the exoticist hopes) not so familiar as to be felt as cliche and thus lose their effectiveness. Exoticism, when it succeeds as exoticism, generally depends on some combination of familiar non-exotic elements, familiar signifiers of the exotic, and in some cases altogether new elements (which may subsequently become familiar exotic signifiers). Familiar signifiers of the exotic do not necessarily embody ideologies in and of themselves: a musical sound can signify "China" and convey an exotically "Chinese" feeling without conveying any particular ideas about China. But such signifiers are often used to give emotional reinforcement to representations with ideological goals: thus in some 1930s Japanese songs, lyrics that celebrate Japanese conquests in China are set to music full of China-exoticism.

The need for a balance between novelty and familiarity implies a temporal process when, for example, an entirely new foreign musical genre or set of genres is introduced into a culture. At first, we might expect reception to be very slow, since the new genre is too unfamiliar to be appealing: it is not exotic, but simply alien and incomprehensible to most people. As familiarity increases, it develops exotic appeal and grows in popularity. Later, as it becomes more familiar, the genre or elements of it may lose their specific geographical associations and become "generic" exoticism, or even lose their exotic feeling altogether and fall into general use, as thoroughly domesticated "music" no longer perceived as foreign. In other cases, the exotic associations may remain but lose their appeal through over-familiarity, and become a target of parody (as has happened, for example, with the Tin Pan Alley style of "Hawaiian" music and many other Hawaii-signifiers in the
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U.S.). The ideological status of the foreign country associated with an exotic genre can affect this process in various ways: a negative trend in ideological views of a country will, for example, often hasten either the disappearance or the de-exoticization of genres associated with it (this occurred in Japan, for example, with Chinese-derived music during the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–5, and with U.S. and British music during the Pacific War). Conversely, a wave of exoticism can help to bring about a positive shift in ideological views of the object of exoticism. I would argue, for example, that the long, slow (and still incomplete) shift from strongly negative to more positive ideological representations of African-Americans in U.S. popular culture has been given impetus by the ongoing exoticization of African-American culture by white Americans (especially through musical styles such as ragtime, jazz, blues, swing, rock’n’roll, and rap).

A different view of exoticism, alluded to earlier, sees it as ideology in disguise. According to this view exoticism is only superficially a move in the direction of the Other, while beneath the surface it is really only another way to incorporate the Other into some pre-existing framework. In the above quotes from Middleton and Savigliano, for example, the denunciation of exoticism seems to derive from an assumption that exoticism is merely a cover for ideology, in particular an imperialist Western ideology that assigns a subordinate place to non-Western countries and peoples. Savigliano sees the playfulness and fantasy of exoticism as inherently connected to the "frivolous" allocation of identities, "exploitation," and the "will to power over the unknown." But I think she is confusing two quite different levels of approach toward the foreign, namely the exotic and the ideological, that work independently or against each other at least as often as they work together. Most of the exotic signifiers that people encounter on a daily basis (of which food, clothing, visual arts, and music are perhaps the most common) do not, I am convinced, convey specific ideological content with any clarity or consistency: what they convey is a pleasurable feeling of foreignness associated with a foreign place. When non-Chinese people go to a Chinese restaurant they may enjoy the exotic "Chineseness" of the place as well as the food, but the experience does not lead them to form any consistent set of ideas about China (except perhaps that it is a place where one finds this kind of food, this kind of painting, etc.). A group of people who enter a Chinese restaurant with vastly divergent ideological views of China will almost certainly leave the restaurant with those divergent views intact. It is easy for an imaginative scholar to claim to find an ideological message underlying any exotic representation: I would not say that such claims should be rejected altogether, but they should certainly be treated with skepticism.

In products whose primary goal is to propagate ideology, exoticism is indeed often called into service for that purpose. But when the paramount goal is to sell a product by entertaining or attracting an audience, ideological content is usually present only to the extent that it contributes to this goal. In other cases ideology may be present to serve some subsidiary goal (e.g. satisfying the censorship bureau) separate from the primary goal of entertainment. Thus exoticism and ideology may both be present, but working toward different purposes. Some forms of exoticism may reinforce broad forms of ideology: the use of certain generic exotic elements to signify a group of ob-
ject countries without distinction, for example, might reinforce the idea that these countries are in some way "the same." But exoticism, in general, is consistent with a wide range of ideas and attitudes toward the object country, from respect and admiration to amused condescension (although not with outright hatred). Some of these ideas and attitudes are compatible with imperialist ideologies, while others are not. It is a mistake to assume that the mere presence of exoticism implies any particular ideological message.

Exoticism has sometimes, in fact, been seen as representing an ideological stance in opposition to imperialist and nationalist ideologies. In this view exoticism becomes a form of opposition to the dominant discourses of Home, and in the process becomes yet another (anti-dominant) discourse of Home: it incorporates an idea of the Other into an oppositional ideology, without necessarily any real knowledge or understanding of the Other. Todorov takes such a view in his sharply-drawn contrast between nationalism and exoticism: "If I am a nationalist, I proclaim that the values of my country, whatever they may be, are superior to all others. No, the exoticist replies, the country with superior values is a country whose only relevant characteristic is that it is not my own" (1993:264). Both nationalist and exoticist, as defined by Todorov, are engaging in the "exemplification" (to use Celestin's term) of different ideological systems.

My own view (based on a different definition of exoticism from Todorov's) is that a representation of the foreign, if it is to convey the distinct pleasure in foreignness that would make it exoticism, can never be totally subsumed by a familiar ideology: it is attractively foreign precisely because it points toward something unknown, different, not entirely explainable. The exotically attractive country, I would argue, must be seen as having relevant characteristics other than the mere fact of not being one's own, even if these characteristics are not fully known. Indeed, what makes it exotically attractive is precisely that its attractive characteristics, although believed to be real, are surrounded by a certain mystery. However much exoticism may be subordinated to ideology in particular cases, it derives its appeal and its effects from what lies outside of ideology. It is quite possible to experience those effects or to use them in artistic creations even while believing in the superior values of one's own country. Thus one can be a nationalist and an exoticist at the same time.

Todorov's view of exoticism as a belief that foreign countries have superior values raises an important point, however: exoticism, in my sense of pleasure in the foreign, even when explicitly used in the service of ethnocentric ideology, contains the potential to stimulate an ideological shift toward explicit admiration of the foreign, which may entail a corresponding denigration of one's home country. In other words, a positive feeling towards a foreign object tends to exert psychological pressure towards a positive ideological positioning for the object. This makes exoticism a somewhat risky tool to use for the promotion of imperialist ideology. More generally, the imagined foreign provides a mental space in which new possibilities can be explored and familiar values examined from different angles. Exoticism is thus difficult to harness as a vehicle for any particular ideology: it carries the danger of unintended consequences, of laying the seeds for all sorts of criti-
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cal reassessments and new ideological formulations.

In this sense there is a correspondence. I think, between the ideology/exoticism pair and the structure/anti-structure pair posited by Victor Turner. Specifically, I see ideology as an element of Turner's "structure," while exoticism is part of what he calls the "liminoid": the area of cultural activity that arose with the industrial separation of time into "work" and "leisure," in which people are relatively free to "play" with symbolic forms and with alternatives to established structures. The liminoid differs from the pre-industrial "liminal" largely in that participation in it is optional (e.g. one can choose to attend or not to attend a concert, to buy or not to buy a record), it often contains an element of social critique, and it can contain the seeds of future structure (see Turner 1982: 20-59). In many cases the "play" of exoticism (and of the liminoid in general) is firmly contained within the established structures of society. But in other cases exoticism may be a channel for active opposition and pursuit of alternatives to established structures, as occurred, for example, with the 1960s U.S. counterculture's interest in Indian music and religion.9

Even when exoticism does not lead to outright ideological subversion it often interacts with ideology in a dialectical fashion. Exoticism derives from the impulse to move outside of familiar structures of meaning and to find something there: something beautiful, enchanting, or valuable. But the process of finding that thing also involves bringing it back home, i.e. modifying existing structures or creating new structures of meaning to contain it, so that the enjoyment of exoticism (or the production and consumption of exoticism) gradually produces and changes ideology.10 The new or modified ideology, in turn, can become a new framework outside of which new exotic pleasure must be sought. Pursuing the attraction of the unfamiliar inevitably ends by rendering it familiar, necessitating the pursuit of a new unfamiliar. At the level of the individual, this is simply the process of acquiring knowledge and beliefs about the foreign, a process that is pursued to different degrees by different people over the course of their lives. At the level of a society — a capitalist consumer society, at least — the constant demand for the exotic, together with the constant familiarization (and hence de-exoticization) of the exotic creates a dynamic movement in both ideological formulations of the foreign and in the cultural production of exoticism. As the world continues to "globalize," this dynamic interaction between the expansion of popular knowledge of the foreign on the one hand, and the continued pursuit of pleasure in the foreign beyond the limits of popular

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9 This interest, in the form of Bob Dylan's meeting with Baul musicians of Bengal, was described by Turner as an example of "the convergence, under modern conditions of transportation and communication, of Western and Eastern liminars and communitas-bearers" (1969: 164).

10To the extent that new knowledge/ideology imparts a feeling of power, this process suggests that exoticism may indeed be connected to Savigliano's "will to power over the unknown." But the interaction between exoticism and ideology can take place under any set of relations between subject and object countries, and the resulting ideology may or may not have anything to do with imperialism or exploitation.
knowledge on the other, forms the environment in which people of different cultures will continue to encounter and to imagine one another.

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