I. Introduction

In 1907, Alfred Marshall, one of the most influential economists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Britain and one of founders of neo-classical economics, gave a lecture titled “Social Possibilities of Economic Chivalry” in Royal Economic Society. The lecture was later published in The Economic Journal. In the lecture, he insisted that “the most important and progressive business work is scarcely ever without a large chivalrous element, and is often mainly dominated by chivalrous motives” (Marshall 1907, p. 342). Criticizing collectivism, Marshal concluded that “if we can educate this chivalry, the country will flourish under private enterprise” (Marshall 1907, p. 346). Seven years before the lecture, Inazo Nitobe wrote a book, Bushido: The Soul of Japan, in English and introduced traditional Japanese samurai ethics to the West. Nitobe’s bushido, literally “the way of the Samurai” in Japanese, was influenced by chivalry in Britain. This paper examines Inazo Nitobe’s concept of bushido and its application to modern commercial society. One might think that this is exactly what Marshall attempted.

Key words : Chivalry, Economics, Intellectual History, Comparative Cultural Studies
to do; however, I conclude that the way in which Nitobe sought the social possibility of *bushido* was different from Marshall’s objective.

Inazo Nitobe was born in 1868, the late Edo period, as a low-ranking samurai. He attended Sapporo Agricultural College, became a Christian, and later studied at Johns Hopkins University in the United States and other universities in Germany. After graduating from Halle University in Germany, Nitobe taught agriculture at the Sapporo Agricultural College and colonial policies at Tokyo Imperial University, and became the Headmaster of the First High School (*Daiichi Koto Gakko*). He also worked as a technical adviser to the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan and later became Under-Secretary General of the League of Nations.

Nitobe played an important role as an intellectual in pre-war Japan, a time when Westernization and nationalism arose as a subject of discussion, and his works are still popular among Japanese today. However, there still remains a diverse interpretation of his ideas. Nitobe’s *Bushido* has been widely read and referred to by the Japanese. When the book was published, it was also translated into Japanese and, with other books on *bushido*, such as Tesshu Yamaoka’s work, a *bushido* boom was sparked that lasted from the middle to the late Meiji period. After the Second World War, several translated versions of *Bushido* have been published periodically. Some intellectuals, however, have criticized *Bushido* as embodying barbarous and feudalistic virtues (Ota 1986). It is true that *Bushido* was misrepresented by the Japanese Army in order to support its militarism before the Second World War. Others claimed that *Bushido* does not reflect the character of a real samurai since Nitobe’s *Bushido* was influenced by Christian ethics (Ota 1986 and Kanno 2004).

Nitobe’s *Bushido* has been referred to by those who have attempted to revive Japanese traditional values. From this point of view, Nitobe’s thought can be seen as compatible with conservatives who seek the revival of Japanese traditional ethics. On the other hand, others, such as scholars of Japanese Christianity, admire Nitobe as a liberal. As will be shown in this paper, Nitobe insisted that traditional culture was important not because it was unique, but because it was deeply connected with western values and Christianity on several levels.

In examining Nitobe’s idea of *bushido*, it is important to note that, in *Bushido*, Nitobe clearly declares that the light of *bushido*, as an ethical theory may be going out. He realized that traditional *bushido* could not exist independently in a modern society in which the social foundation of the samurai class was gone. In addition, though he is famous as the author of *Bushido*, he accepted that Western individualism was a modern value that should become established in Japan. He studied economics at university, and as a professor at Tokyo Imperial University, he was a supporter of Adam Smith’s theories of economics. In *Bushido*, he referred to “the high commercial integrity of the Anglo-Saxon race.” Thus, it is reasonable to think that he approved of the new moral structure in Western society. Nevertheless, he did not believe that commercial morality could support modern society, and he called for a better substitute.

*Bushido* took on an important role here. Nitobe mentioned Edmund Burke’s eulogy on chivalry in *Bushido*, and Nitobe’s concept of *bushido* was influenced by the system of chivalry
in Britain. According to Nitobe, in Europe, Christianity cultivated “the spirit of chivalry,” which was a class spirit, and chivalry was transformed into the way of the gentleman, a moral code of the common people. He regarded the spirit of the gentleman as a source of democracy and economic success in Britain. Finding historical comparisons between the chivalry of Europe and the bushido of Japan, he concluded that bushido should take on a modern form just as chivalry was transformed into the spirit of the gentleman. He called this new form “heimindo” (the way of commoners) or “shonindo” (the way of merchants).

As Christianity had adopted chivalry and transformed it into a universal morality in the West, bushido needed the assistance of a religion. Nitobe introduced the morals of bushido to the Japanese people through popular journals such as Jitsugyo no Nihon and compared these morals with Western morals, particularly those of Christianity. In this way, he tried to imbue the Japanese people, who were concerned with appearance and status, with the sense of inner beliefs and respect for individuality that are essential for economic development.

In this paper, I will first investigate the meaning of Nitobe’s remarks in Bushido that bushido as a moral code will fade. I will also show that despite his respect for bushido, he supported Adam Smith’s economic theories. Second, I will examine the way he modernized bushido as a foundation for economic development through the comparison to chivalry and the figure of the gentleman in Britain. Third, I will illustrate the way he cultivated religious thought in the Japanese.

II. Bushido and its Future

1. The Sources of Samurai’s High Morality

Obviously, Bushido is Nitobe’s most famous work and, therefore, he is well known as an advocate of Japanese traditional samurai ethics even in present Japan. In 1900, Nitobe published Bushido: The Soul of Japan in English and introduced Japanese traditional samurai ethics to the West. At the same time, the book was translated into Japanese and this evoked a bushido boom in the mid- and late Meiji periods, when the politics of money and excessive individualism came to be seen as the cause of various social problems (Sakamoto 1991, p.153). In this respect, some might say that Nitobe desired to protect Japanese traditional ethics as a value that sustained Japanese society. Indeed, Nitobe applauded the English conservative politician Edmund Burke in chapter one of Bushido as well as in a later book where he expressed an admiration for Burke’s political philosophy (Nitobe 1933, p. 200). Shunsuke Tsurumi has also pointed out that Nitobe’s thought was well suited to what Karl Mannheim defines as “conservative thought” (Tsurumi 1960, p. 130). In this sense, it is possible to regard Nitobe as a conservative intellectual. However, I suspect that relying too much on his Bushido causes misunderstandings about his thought on Japanese morality. First, it was written for Western readers. Second, Nitobe declared the end of bushido in the very book in which he approved it. In this section, I will investigate in what respect we can or should rely on his theory of bushido.
In *Bushido*, Nitobe described Buddhism, Shinto, and Confucianism as the sources of *bushido* and listed several virtues of *bushido*, such as justice (*gi*), courage (*yu*), benevolence (*jin*), and faith (*makoto*). First, we should keep in mind that Nitobe wrote *Bushido* in order to introduce Japanese culture to Western society when Japan, as a backward Eastern country, joined the Western community. As he said, “I wrote it [*Bushido*] to let Westerners know that there is a moral concept in Japan, there is a moral concept called *bushido* ...” (Nitobe 1912b, p.452). It was not Nitobe’s purpose to revive traditional samurai ethics in Meiji Japan. Since he tried to introduce positive aspects of the West to Japan and positive aspects of Japan to the West, we should take into account the possibility that he emphasized ideal aspects of Japanese morality in works that he wrote in English, such as *Bushido*. In such writings, it is difficult to see what he saw as the shortcoming of Japanese society. Indeed, once we turn our attention to his works written for the Japanese people, we find his criticism of Japanese traditional culture and his efforts to improve Japanese society by introducing Western culture. Since my interest in this paper is his moral theory of Japanese society, it is beneficial to investigate not only *Bushido* but also Nitobe’s writings aimed at the Japanese audience. This is why I will focus on his popular essays from the early Taisho period.

I would like to point out the second issue regarding *Bushido*. In *Bushido*, Nitobe clearly declares that the light of *bushido*, as an ethical theory, “may be going to go out.” (Nitobe 1900, p.140). In this venue, we cannot insist that the revival of *bushido* was based on Nitobe’s idea. It is, of course, possible that the Japanese people could and can learn something from *bushido*. However, it is important to remember that the social structure in which samurai actually lived in the pre-modern period was quite different from the modern society established by the Meiji Restoration. Therefore, in order to understand the reason why Nitobe declared the end of *bushido*, I will briefly discuss how the environment of pre-modern Japan provided the source of the samurai’s high morality.

Historically, samurai had emerged as important players in Japanese history during the Kamakura period; we can divide the social character of samurai into two periods: Kamakura and Muromachi constitute the first period and the Edo period is the second. The most notable difference is that the main identity of samurai was as warriors until the Edo period, whereas samurai gradually took on a bureaucratic character during the Edo period. Here, however, I would like to emphasize the common characteristics of samurai during these periods, so that we can clearly understand Nitobe’s intention. First, samurai identify themselves as warriors and specialists in military matters. In the medieval period and even the bureaucratic Edo period, samurai had the right to carry swords. Nitobe points out that “Bushido made the sword its emblem of power and prowess” and “[t]he very possession of the dangerous instrument imparts to him [a samurai] a feeling and an air of self-respect and responsibility” (Nitobe 1900, pp.104-105). Second, they had a financial foundation by which to live. Samurai in the medieval period maintained their independence based on the possession of lands: “The critical aspect of the medieval samurai culture of honor was that it represented the sovereign standing of a socially autonomous landed elite. As a result of their feudal possession of land
as well as their military ability to defend their possessions, the samurai class developed
the sentiments of honor as a cultural representation of their power and independence”
(Ikegami 1995, p.34). In the Edo period, Samurai were separated from their land and became
bureaucrats who received stipends. Nevertheless, it is important to note that unlike salaries
today most samurai regarded their stipends as their “fortune” (kasan) or “hereditary
privilege.” Hamana Atsushi states, “We can say that while there were systemic differences
between the possession of land of the European nobility and the familial ties of Japanese
warriors, substantively, in terms of ‘patrimonial stipends’ there were similarities with Europe”
(Sonoda et al. 1995, p.82). Ikegami also points out the existence of the sense of honor through
medieval and early modern (Tokugawa) samurai: “Although both types of samurai were
socially very different, honor consistently appeared at the center of their cultural identity as
a warrior class” (Ikegami 1995, p.16). Ikegami called it honorific individualism (Ikegami 1995,
p.352). Samurai, thus, could behave with high morality because of the duty accompanied by
these privileges, a form of noblesse oblige.

However, after the Meiji Restoration, the new government, which was established
by lower-rank samurai, abolished most samurai privileges. For example, during the early
Meiji period the government abolished hereditary social classes, hereditary stipends of the
samurai class, and the right of samurai to have a last name and to carry swords. Universal
conscription expanded the right to serve in the military to all civilians. These changes
undermined not only the samurai’s physical conditions but also the mental foundations that
they had as a privileged class. Based on these facts, Nitobe declared the end of bushido: “the
medium in which their ardent deeds took shape is forever gone” (Nitobe 1900, p.136).

2. Bushido and Commercial Integrity

Although Nitobe declared an end to the conventional bushido, he did not argue that
bushido itself would become extinct. He was anxious about the moral problem created by the
dramatic change in Japanese society, and thought that bushido could somehow help to solve
this situation. In the following section, I will discuss how Nitobe applied bushido to modern
Japan. First, we should pay close attention to the last part of Bushido. It is well known that
Nitobe remarks that bushido should be grafted onto Christianity. He insists that bushido needs
to adopt the principles of Christianity in a way that meets the needs of modern society. Thus,
Nitobe states:

Bushido laid particular stress on the moral conduct of rulers and public men and of
nations, whereas the ethics of Christ, which deal almost solely with individuals and his
personal followers, will find more and more practical application, as individualism, in its
capacity of a moral factor, grows in potency. (Nitobe 1900, p.140)

First, Nitobe accepted that Western individualism represented a modern value that should
become established in Japan. He studied economics at university, and as a professor of Tokyo
Imperial University he was one of the supporters of Adam Smith’s theories. As he states in his later lecture entitled *New Liberalism*, he supported British liberalism and individualism throughout his entire life. According to Adam Smith, in a commercial society, people exchange goods in accordance with their self-interest; and the development of this commercial society then makes the rules and manners for exchanges more complex, fostering politeness and socialness among people. In such a society, conventional military virtues would be replaced by these sophisticated manners (Smith 1982, p.539). In *Bushido*, Nitobe referred to “the high commercial integrity of the Anglo-Saxon race” (Nitobe 1900, p.65). Therefore, it is reasonable to state that he approved of the new moral structure in Western society. Nevertheless, he did not believe that commercial morality would be enough to support modern society, and he called for a better substitute.

For example, in a lecture at Kobe Commercial High School (later Kobe University) in 1905 entitled “Commercial morality,” Nitobe requires of students something higher than commercial morality. He says, “In the coming trade war, relying only on commercial morality will not be enough” and, although those who obey commercial morality are good merchants, “such a thing is actually unimportant,” and he asks students to “think about how low such a standard is.” Mentioning the Anglo-Saxon race’s success, he concludes the lecture as follows: “If there was nothing that supported them and urged them forward, the Anglo-Saxon race could not have achieved the present progress” and “if you want to be a good business man, learn something higher and larger than commercial ethics from the Anglo-Saxon race.”

Second, according to the aforementioned passage in *Bushido*, Nitobe considered Christian ethics to be suitable for individualistic societies. Given this second point, it is possible to state that he regarded Christian ethics as a substitute for commercial morality to support modern society. This is why he attempted to graft Christian ethics onto *bushido*. However, from the book *Bushido*, we cannot know how he incorporated Christian ethics into *bushido* since he did not offer concrete examples.

The question therefore arises as to, first, how *bushido* could be a moral base in individualistic society and, second, in this process, how *bushido* and Christianity came to be linked together in Nitobe’s thought. In *Bushido*, Nitobe did not clearly answer this question. Therefore, we need to turn to other works he published during the late Meiji and the Early Taisho periods. In order to answer the first question, I start with an examination of the concept of *heimindo* (the way of common people) that he created as a modern version of *bushido*.

### III. From *Bushido* to *Heimindo* and *Shonindo*

#### 1. *Bushido* and *Heimindo*

In this section, I examine Nitobe’s *heimindo* to clarify how he tried to adapt *bushido* to modern Japanese society. Nitobe published a series of essays on democracy in *Jitsugyo no Nihon* in 1919. In these essays, he called the essence of democracy *heimindo* as he called Japanese
pre-modern virtue *bushido*. In Japan, the word “democracy” was translated as *minshu-shugi* or *minpon-shugi*, literally a principle (*shugi*) in which the people (*min*) have sovereignty (*shu*) or a principle that is based (*pon*) on people’s wishes. Nitobe points out that these translations were misleading since these words could give people the impression that democracy would violate the Japanese national polity (*kokutai*). Instead, he suggested translating democracy simply as *heimindo*.

He used the term *heimindo* for the first time in 1904, in the same meaning as in 1919. Although he had a concept of *heimindo* in the early period, he did not use the term, because he thought that the Japanese were not ready to discuss it. Once the democracy movement arose during the Taisho democracy period, he finally felt a necessity to express his idea of democracy using the term *heimindo*. In this paper, I first explain *heimindo* as he used it in 1919 for a better understanding of my argument, and then return to his early essay in the late Meiji and early Taisho periods to examine a process in which he attempted to realize the concept of *heimindo*.

Nitobe’s *heimindo* is a spirit in which *bushido* is expanded. *Bushido* is a class spirit. In the period of democracy, Nitobe says, not a class spirit but a spirit that the common people should hold must be a national morality. By expanding *bushido* to *heimindo*, he does not mean to say that “people should abolish a sublime samurai spirit and be depraved to rude and inferior townsman and peasants’ spirits” (Nitobe 1919, p.541). Rather, he insists that *bushido* has a responsibility to improve the commoners’ low ideals. Characteristics of morality, such as loyalty, shame, benevolence, and justice, are what all Japanese—not only samurai—should follow. That is to say, it is “to elevate commoners to the status of samurai” (Nitobe 1919, pp.541-542).

As Mitani Taichiro has pointed out, Nitobe defined democracy “as a moral matter rather than a political matter” (Mitani 1995, p.77). Nitobe states, “I think that politics work well only when the democracy prevails whether morally or socially in the fundamental place of politics before political democracy is put into effect. More simply, democratic politics (*minpon seiji*) appears only when there is a democratic spirit (*minpon shiso*). The democratic spirit is, then, *heimindo* as I said before” (Nitobe 1919, p.543). He also points out that *heimindo* is a way to cultivate behavior to respect man’s “personality (*jinkaku*)” regardless of wealth and education level. Unlike *bushido*, which is a virtue of rulers, *heimindo* is a universal moral principle that Japanese and even all humankind should follow.

Our next question is how one can cultivate the behavior to respect man’s personality by means of *heimindo*, and how Christianity relates to this process. To answer the first question, let me go back to *Bushido* again. Nitobe states:

One remarkable difference between the experience of Europe and of Japan is, that, whereas in Europe, when chivalry was weaned from feudalism and was adopted by the Church, it obtained a fresh lease of life, in Japan no religion was large enough to nourish it. (Nitobe 1900, p.135)
According to Nitobe, in Europe Christianity cultivated “the spirit of Chivalry,” which was a class spirit, and chivalry (kishido) was transformed into the way of the gentleman (shinshido) that was a moral code of the common people. In an essay “Two Qualities of Gentleman” in 1930, he refers to Edmund Burke and remarks:

Edmund Burke defined civilization as the spirit of a gentleman and of religion. Meekness taught of religion must add grace to a proud chevalier to make a real gentleman of him. Similarly, religion will prove to be a power in perfecting the character of one in whose mind the samurai ideal is uppermost. (Nitobe 1933, p. 81)

As he indicates in the second paragraph of the essay above, Nitobe thought that “few historical comparisons can be more judiciously made than between the Chivalry of Europe and the Bushido of Japan” (Nitobe 1900, p.135). Therefore, bushido has to transform into a modern form as the Chivalry transformed into the spirit of the gentleman. In 1909, he argues,

I have already said that moral sentiments are the common meeting ground of all the branches of the human family. There is brotherhood between an English gentleman and a Japanese samurai—a spiritual bond between them. The gentleman is a more modern type than the samurai, and hence he can adjust himself more readily to the new era. The latter has yet much to learn of the former in order to make his début into the society of the twentieth century. (Nitobe 1909a, p.473) 

Heimindo is a form of the samurai adapted to modern times. Nitobe compared chivalry and bushido in the medieval period and gentlemen and heimindo in the modern period. As Nishimura points out, Nitobe found similarity in “a reform process of elitist culture in the west and the east,” namely “gentlemanizing chivalry (kishido no shinshido−ka)” and the “popularizing of bushido (bushido no heimindo−ka)” (Nishimura 2004, p.447).

2. Bushido and Shonindo

In a 1933 lecture entitled “bushido and shonindo” (literally, the way of samurai and the way of merchants), Nitobe explains this process as follows. In Britain, the word “gentlemen” originally meant squires, namely large landowners in the countryside, and the title was not used for merchants. However, merchants claimed to be gentlemen around the early 18th century. Although it caused some confusion at the time, this title gradually spread to merchants. By 1933, the word “gentleman” contained a spiritual meaning by which people who knew shame (haji) and respected justice (gi) could claim to be gentlemen. Thus, personality—in other words, acting like a gentleman—overwhelmed occupation in Britain. Gentlemen could not be distinguished by appearance. They could talk about literature and philosophy so were therefore all gentlemanly (Nitobe 1933, p.355). For Nitobe, gentlemen are those
whose personality overwhelms their occupation. He believed them to be leaders of economic prosperity in Britain. Although he respected Adam Smith, his view on the development of a commercial society was closer to Edmund Burke’s view that civilization and manners were preconditions for commerce, whereas Smith held that commerce creates manners and civilization.\textsuperscript{13}

To sum up, \textit{bushido} has to transform into \textit{heimindo} and \textit{shonindo}, just as chivalry as a class spirit was universalized and became the spirit of the gentleman. In \textit{heimindo} and \textit{shonindo}, personality overwhelms occupation as in the way of the gentleman. This is why Nitobe stated that \textit{heimindo} respect personality regardless of wealth and the level of education. However, it is not clear how Christianity relates to the process. In the next chapter, I will discuss how Christianity affects the process in which \textit{bushido} transforms into \textit{heimindo} and \textit{shonindo} by examining Nitobe’s writings in the late Meiji and the early Taisho periods.

IV. Internalization of Virtues

1. \textit{Bushido} and Christianity in Nitobe’s Essays on Popular Journals

Before he expressed his idea of \textit{heimindo} in 1919, Nitobe wrote copious essays and articles on morality in popular journals, such as \textit{Jitsugyo no Nihon}, especially from the late Meiji to the Taisho period. He explains practical matters to uneducated laborers and women, such as how to organize everyday life and associate with others, using familiar examples. These articles were published as books, including \textit{Shuyo} (\textit{Self-help}, 1911), \textit{Yowatari no Michi} (\textit{The Way to Succeed}, 1912), and \textit{Jikei} (\textit{Self-care}, 1916), which became bestsellers in Taisho Japan. In these works, Nitobe often referred to certain virtues of \textit{bushido}, such as shame, honor, courage, honesty, politeness, sympathy, and loyalty, which were compared to Christian ethics. These works were, however, barely noticed by supporters and opponents of Nitobe when compared with \textit{Bushido}.\textsuperscript{14} In order to understand Nitobe’s thought, I believe that a careful investigation of these less systematic articles is essential since he intentionally placed great emphasis on writing such practical articles (Nitobe 1909b, pp.683-684) and the essence of his thought is mostly implicit in such articles. In the following section, I will therefore examine the ways \textit{bushido} and Christianity were discussed in these articles.

2. Shame

In \textit{The Chrysanthemum and the Sword}, Ruth Benedict defines European and Japanese culture as guilt and shame cultures, respectively. As Takeda (1961, p.304-306) and Nishimura (2004, p.426-435) have pointed out, Nitobe had already defined both cultures in the same way even before Benedict. Nitobe gives us an example; in the West, parents remonstrated with their children about their behavior by saying, “That is not right.” On the other hand, in Japan, parents reprove their children by saying, “You will be laughed at by others if you do it.” The children feel \textit{haji} and they are discreet in the behavior. Therefore, the Japanese worry much about their reputation when they grow up (Nitobe 1912a, p.308). Nitobe concludes that
because of this difference between the West and the East, the Westerner has firmer beliefs than the Easterner. That is to say, “there is a significant difference in our improvement, depending on whether we set a standard of disgrace on the social form or one’s inner self” (Nitobe 1912a, p.310).

However, Nitobe does not insist that the Japanese people should directly import this Western culture. Unlike Benedict, who accentuates the differences to be found in each culture, Nitobe emphasizes the similarities. He points out that “we sometimes hear that the Japanese people do not have a concept of guilt. However, I do not think that it is true” (Nitobe 1912a, p.305). He explains that there are two types of haji, to feel shame morally and to feel shame socially. English distinguishes them by using shame for moral haji and shyness and bashfulness for social haji, whereas Japanese do not distinguish them clearly. However, the distinction does exist in Japanese as well. In Japan, to feel shame socially is “hazukashi,” which is young women’s awareness not to violate social rules (nori) that change depending on time and place. On the other hand, Nitobe finds moral shame in bushido’s “renchishin.” He argues that renchishin in bushido is not to feel shame socially. Rather, it comes from a sense of respect for justice, so the standard is based on whether or not a person violates justice. In this regard, the samurai often employed the term haji or renchishin not to refer to shame, but to guilt. He sees renchishin as an equivalent of the concept of feeling guilty in the West and thus being conscious of renchishin, which is based on one’s own inner standards, is useful for the purpose of personal moral cultivation (Nitobe 1912a, pp.135-139).

3. Honor

Nitobe argues about honor (meiyo), the opposite of shame, in the same way. The Japanese people set a standard of honor outside of themselves. On the contrary, the standard of honor in the West is “whether it is right or not reflecting on oneself” (Nitobe 1911, p.185). It is, of course, possible to use the Japanese sense of honor for self-discipline. People could be prudent based on a sense that “I am not able to be dirty because I have such a confidence in people.” However, he insists that, although such use of honor cannot be ignored as a way of self-discipline, it is not the best motive of morality. The Japanese people have respected such social honor because they have not known that there were other motives for behavior than that honor. Nitobe concludes that in the modern Japanese society the behavior should be based on something higher than the sense of honor (Nitobe 1911, p.212-216).

As Nishimura points out, when Nitobe discusses honor in Bushido, he explains bushido’s haji as a sense that contains both social shame and moral shame. However, in Yowatari no Michi, he comes to emphasize moral shame in haji. That is to say, it is reasonable to say that “he found ‘a culture of moral shame (renchishin)’ in a tradition of bushido in order to dismantle ‘the culture of haji,’ have the Japanese people understand ‘the culture of guilt,’ and have the culture take root [in Japan]” (Nishimura 2004, p.21).
4. Courage

Nitobe explains courage (yu) in the same way. He points out that in both the West and the East, pre-modern society respected courage in external actions, namely bravery. For example, in ancient Rome “bravery” was a synonym for “virtue.” Though Christianity taught obedience and meekness, not many people followed these. Therefore, Nitobe says, it is understandable that Nietzsche called Christianity a slave morality. Nitobe, however, doubts that Christianity was truly meek. He insists that the teaching of Christianity “did not always mean that people should obey unjust requests blindly” and “people cannot meet the purpose of religion without masculine spirits” (Nitobe 1916, p.30). Although Nitobe accepts the importance of the masculine spirit in a calculating modern society, such as sacrificing one’s own life to help the weak and crushing the strong, he believes that “it is absolutely wrong to practice the customs that developed in a society where the law was not established enough under constitutional politics in a law-governed state” (Nitobe 1916, p.31). In the modern period, the spirit that maintained this action is more important than the action itself and the spirit should not be directed toward the outside but toward one’s inner self in order that the person may develop personal control. Nitobe concludes that this is what is called “moral courage” in the West.

In another part, Nitobe compares Plutarch’s Parallel Lives and the New Testament. Despite being impressed by stories of ancient heroes in Parallel Lives, Nitobe regards them as examples of impetuous courage directed toward the outside. On the other hand, though the teaching of the New Testament is seemingly meek, there are inviolable things inside. He calls it a spiritual, composed courage that is directed toward one’s inner self, and concludes that the strength of mind in the New Testament is much stronger than that of the Parallel Lives (Nitobe 1916, p.56). For Nitobe, the “true power” is “inner conviction and the will to endure any hardship in order to fulfill it” (Nitobe 1916, p.61).

He then points out that in bushido samurai despised courage that was nothing but bravery, calling it a reckless courage (choyu). Thus, the real samurai is he “whose appearance is calm and amiable and who has no trouble with others, but, who once an emergency takes place, has inviolable power” (Nitobe 1916, p.59). Nitobe claims that understanding bushido’s teaching based on a samurai’s rustic appearance is a very childish bushido, and that the ideal samurai knows the pathos of things, has benevolence, and is calm and obedient. Thus, he encourages people to change the conventional image of bushido (Nitobe 1916, p.73). As we have seen, Nitobe first emphasizes the importance of an inner conviction in Christianity and then finds its equivalent in the Japanese traditional ethics, bushido.

5. Sincerity

Nitobe also talks about a sense of veracity or sincerity (makoto), which is one of bushido’s virtues. He uses terms from William E. H. Lecky, an Irish historian, and explains the progress of “three forms of veracity,” namely industrial, political, and philosophical veracity. The first stage of veracity is what Nitobe calls “commercial honesty.” In this stage, people avoid dishonesty because it puts them at a disadvantage in business. “As credit improves,
dishonesty makes a loss in an estimation of profit and loss” (Nitobe 1912a, p.257). He calls this form of honesty “the high commercial integrity of the Anglo-Saxon races” (Nitobe 1900, p.65). The second stage of veracity is “political veracity.” According to Nitobe, this comes from a politician’s moral shame (renchishin), which is a higher motive than interests are. However, this form of veracity is also a relative value that exists within the political party or between politicians and their constituencies. Politicians lie to opponents and they could lie to their constituencies as well when the truth could disturb the public. The most respectable veracity is “philosophical integrity.” In this stage, people obey the truth simply because it is true and “insisting that this theory puts a partner in trouble or makes use of the partner is completely out of question” (Nitobe 1912a, 259).

In Yowatari no Michi, Nitobe does not require the Japanese people to achieve the third stage, philosophical integrity, since, he says, it is the most difficult task to achieve. He even mentions that it is honestly difficult to expect the public to obey political veracity. Introducing the Westerner’s observation on the Japanese merchants’ low credit compared to the high credit of Chinese merchants, Nitobe claims it necessary to improve commercial honesty before philosophical honesty is established. Unlike other virtues that he expected from the Japanese public, Nitobe does not ask them for higher morality in terms of honesty in Yowatari no Michi. However, it does not mean that he dismisses the higher forms of veracity. As I mentioned before, Nitobe requires students at Kobe Commercial High School to learn those things that are higher and greater than commercial morality. Although he expects the Japanese people to acquire a higher form of veracity in the long term, once he judges that the time to introduce this higher morality to the public has not yet come, such as in Yowatari no Michi, he changes the way he talks.

6. Politeness

He talks about politeness (rei or reisetsu) and explains that there are two kinds of human relationships: vertical and horizontal. The vertical relationship is one between an individual and something higher than the person, such as God. The horizontal relationship is one among people. Though he teaches people to bear something higher than oneself in mind, he does not encourage them to train themselves by living in seclusion. Nitobe thought that people could satisfy human nature only when they are in society. He calls such human desire for coexistence “sociality” (soshiarichii) and links it to rei, politeness: “I think that rei which ancient kings taught was this sociality” (Nitobe 1912a, p.113). Thus, he combines the Japanese traditional politeness, rei, with a Western morality. Based on this, he describes the current corruption of politeness as follows:

Our nation was called a nation of men of virtue (kunshikoku) from ancient times. However, since the Western style was imported at the Meiji Restoration and the Chinese scholarship that has been the base of politeness in Japan had declined, people almost came not to reflect on politeness. In addition, because politeness is conservative, when
people want to reform everything, like the situation at the Restoration, it is natural that politeness whose model is taken from the past declined more and more. At the same time, because people who conducted the reform were all youth who were full of vigor and few obeyed politeness, politeness declined extremely during the Meiji period. (Nitobe 1912a, p.76)

He then asks what real politeness is. The real politeness is, he answers, what a sense of real sincerity and respect for others appears to the outside. Therefore, the appearance without a real sense of respect is merely an empty form. Because the Japanese have been strict about politeness, they ended up emphasizing only the form and, therefore, politeness became rigid. In this way, Nitobe criticizes the Japanese formalism. On the contrary, Westerners are not strict about the form of politeness, but they show sincere politeness not only to superiors but also inferiors (Nitobe 1912a, p.97). Nitobe asks the Japanese to give their courtesy to others based on their personality. The Japanese people tend to use different levels of politeness based on others’ status or wealth; therefore, they pay less attention to politeness toward inferiors than toward superiors. Interestingly, Nitobe convinces readers using a story of a samurai who was shown respecting a merchant. Nitobe suggests the Japanese people show respect to inferiors, such as laborers, by admiring their personality (Nitobe 1912a, p.77).

7. Benevolence

Nitobe compared the benevolence observed in Western society with that of Japan. He believed that benevolence was the first requisite for society because a human being is a social animal. In order for people to live and cooperate, there must be a sense of benevolence that ties a person to others (Nitobe 1912a, p.326). He denies a social theory that envisions social progress based on natural selection in which superiors defeat inferiors and, therefore, that sees society without benevolence (Nitobe 1912a, p.327). Instead, he sees that society progresses from a violent state to a state governed by laws, and from a state of laws to state of morals. He argues that a state of laws is merely superior to a state that is governed by violence, and that a state that is governed by morals is the most respectable state.

In Western society, benevolence had been cultivated through Christianity. Since Christ preached love, and Christianity possesses a wealth of sorrows, benevolence had therefore been cultivated as part of an individualistic Western society. Nitobe also stated that the sense of benevolence in Japan, dojo, forms the basis of the Samurai code. As stated by the Japanese, “the characteristic of the Samurai code is understanding the principle of ‘mono no aware’—pathos of things.” This is a spirit that was maintained in Japanese society during the Meiji period (Nitobe 1912a, p.331). Thus, Nitobe compared the benevolence of the samurai with the love of Christianity.

8. Loyalty and Filial Piety

In the preface of Bushido, the enlarged and revised tenth edition, he remarks that
loyalty (chu) and filial piety (ko) constitute the two wheels of the Japanese morality, and no equivalents of ko can be found in the West (Nitobe 1900, p.12). However, in Jitsugyo no Nihon in 1918, he doubts his previous view that loyalty and filial piety constitute the morality indigenous to Japan. He claims that, though he emphasized the Japanese high sense of these two qualities in Bushido, when he asked himself if only Japanese have a deep sense of loyalty and filial piety, he worried that these qualities held by the Japanese people were actually not so deep. He argues that if filial piety is merely judged by appearance, it is possible to say that the Japanese people have high sense of filial piety. However, if filial piety means sincerity by which children adore and help their parents, filial piety held by Westerners is no less than that of the Japanese. Rather, in the West “children love their parents without being forced to follow the way of filial piety” (Nitobe 1918).

This is, he continues, more true for chu. Even well informed people sometimes insist that chu is a unique kind of Japanese morality that we cannot find in the West. He denies this view and finds true loyal behavior in the West. Loyalty is a concept in which people are faithfully devoted to someone. However, true loyalty does not mean that people respect the shortcomings of a lord and follow the lord blindly. True loyalty requires people to remonstrate mistakes of a lord. If so, Nitobe concludes, “those who show loyalty to their lord cannot show the real loyalty unless they believe something higher than their lord.... Therefore, I think that only a religious person can understand real loyalty” (Nitobe 1918).

Here, it is important to note that Nitobe again introduces the sense of love in the West as the equivalent of filial piety, ko, in Japan. Additionally, he gives the concept of love a universal role by saying that it is a more natural feeling than filial piety. He also insists on the necessity of having a religious mind for the sense of chu. In this process, he urges people to change their conventional sense of loyalty to that of loyalty to something religiously absolute.

We investigated how Nitobe tried to internalize virtues by comparing bushido and Christianity. Nitobe believed that only by this process of internalization, bushido, which was a class spirit, could transform into heimindo and shonindo, which were universal and suitable for modern society. By writing many practical essays in popular journal and books, Nitobe expected Japanese laborers to imbibe professional ethics based on an inner conviction. One might think that this view is comparable with Max Weber’s Protestant ethic. Nitobe was indeed a Quaker, a Protestant group that believes every person has an “inward light.”

V. How to Cultivate a Religious Mind?

Our last question is whether Nitobe attempted to import Christianity into Japan and give it a role in raising bushido as it raised chivalry. If not, a problem remains, namely what kind of religion could adopt bushido and transform it into heimindo and shonindo. Nitobe worried about a lack of religious mentality in Japan compared to the West. He claims that in the West “people go to a church on Sunday and listen a sermon there. It is not worthless at all that
priests and ministers, even though they are ordinary people, preach by quoting from the *Bible* and borrowing speeches and behaviors of saints and kings.” Conversely, he criticizes Japanese society, writing, “Unfortunately, there is no such custom in our country... [the Japanese people are] completely pragmatists and they think that they can solve all problems with money and all matters that have nothing to do with money are not worth listening to” (Nitobe 1934, p.404-403). Yet, while he was a Christian, he did not recommend people be Christian in his popular essays. Rather, he chose a more culturally familiar form of spirituality. For example, he encouraged people to conduct periodic meditation. He also recommended daily prayer facing a household Shinto altar. Through this ordinary action, a sense of higher existence than of a human being would arise in the Japanese. However, Nitobe’s approach is ambiguous if we compare him to other Christian intellectuals such as Uchimura Kanzo. On the one hand, this ambiguity allowed Nitobe to acquire various readers and followers. On the other hand, it weakened his arguments protesting exclusive nationalism in the early twentieth century.

One may wonder why Nitobe persist so much in the basis for high morality. He knew that “the independence of mind” and “the independence of body” relate closely. In *Jikei*, he states that:

People often say that even if we did not have independence of body, it is sufficient to have independence of spirit. Even if our body is restrained, an independent spirit resolves all problems. However, freedom of mind and freedom of body have a close relationship, and it is difficult to take them apart...

An employer could control the mind of a person who receives a salary without any realization. (Nitobe 1916, p.504)

“The independence of mind” that created *bushido* was founded under “the independence of body,” such as the land ownership, stipends, and several privileges the samurai possessed. Without these fortunes and privileges, it is difficult to maintain “the independence of mind.” Regardless of this fact, Nitobe still believed in a way to maintain such independence. Through his popular books, such as *Shuyo, Yowatari no Michi*, and *Jikei*, Nitobe taught that we could maintain “the independence of mind” even if we lost “the independence of body.” At the same time, he realized that “freedom of mind and freedom of body have a close relationship, and it is difficult to take them apart.” Therefore, a foundation that could replace the samurai’s “independence of body” was required; for Nitobe, it was religious conviction. Nitobe’s *shonindo* is “the independence of mind” supported by religious conviction. The question of how to maintain an independent mind continues to be a problem in contemporary Japan, where working environments are becoming increasingly unstable.

VI. Conclusion

Nitobe realized that the traditional *bushido* could not exist by itself in a modern society
in which the social foundation for the samurai class was gone. However, at the same time, he
found a similarity between *bushido* in Japan and chivalry (*kishido*) in the West. In the West,
when the environment that supported chivalry was gone, Christianity, which he thought
suitable to a modern individualistic society because of its emphasis on individuality, adopted
chivalry and transformed it into a universal morality, namely the way of the gentleman
(*shinshido*). He explored doing the same process in Japan; transforming *bushido* into a
universal morality, which he calls *heimindo* and *shonindo*. As we have seen, he introduced
*bushido’s* morals to the Japanese people through popular journals and compared these morals
with those in the West, particularly with Christianity. Through this process, he tried to imbue
the Japanese people, who were concerned with appearance and status, with a sense of inner
belief and respect for one’s personality, which he believed formed the bases of economic
development and democracy in Britain.

Alfred Marshal and Nitobe coincidentally claimed the importance of chivalry and
*bushido* in the West and the East in the early twentieth century, respectively. Both believed
that such feudalistic values can be adapted to modern commercial society, but in a slightly
different way. Whereas Marshal emphasized entrepreneurs to imbibe the spirit of chivalry,
this study showed that Nitobe is more concerned with the ethics of common people.16 More
comprehensive studies on chivalry and *bushido* could offer us new perspectives to compare the
process of economic development between Britain and Japan.

[Notes]

1 The italics and capitalized *Bushido* refer to Nitobe’s work of 1900. Non-capitalized *bushido* refers
to samurai ethics in general.

2 For example, on December 7, 2006, the newspaper *Asahi* carried an article on the new
Fundamental Law of Education entitled “Nitobe’s *Bushido*: Why the Popularity? The Cases of both
the Proponents and the Opponents.” The *Asahi* article concerned two passages relating to the new
Fundamental Law: a remark by the Minister of Education Bunmei Ibuki, who was representative of
the supporters of this law, and an argument in opposition to the law by a teacher’s group at Tokyo
Women’s University where, as its first president, Nitobe had disseminated Christian ethics. Ibuki
Bunmei used *Bushido* as a case to support the revision. He saw *Bushido* as a text that has taught
moral precepts, which were emphasized in the new Fundamental Law, to Japanese. On the other
hand, the teacher’s group that opposed the revision insisted that Nitobe’s ideas, such as respect of
individual value and freedom of spirit, could be found in the existing Fundamental Law. This gave
rise to the following interesting question: “Why is Nitobe so popular?”

3 According to Tsurumi, the most remarkable quality of Mannheim’s “conservative thought” is
that it prefers to use concrete matters rather than abstract concepts. In a recent study, I defined
Nitobe’s thought as conservative liberalism. See Yamamoto (2015b).

4 He also writes as follows. “Alas for knightly virtues! alas for samurai pride! Morality ushered into
the world with the sound of bridges and drums, is destined to fade away as ‘the captains and the
kings depart’” (Nitobe 1900, p.137). “Now its days are closing” (Nitobe 1900, p.139). “Bushido as
an independent code of ethics may vanish …” (Nitobe 1900, p.140). As for the last quote, Nitobe
continue as follows, “but its power will not perish from the earth,” which means Nitobe attempted to
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transform *bushido* into a new form. I will discuss this later.

5 For example, Kanno points out, "*bushido* cannot exist if carrying swords and cutting others by the swords even for trivial personal matters (or rather because they are trivial) are not permitted." (Kanno 2004, pp.232-233)

6 Sakamoto also points out that Fukuzawa Yukichi and Kuga Katsunan realized that the samurai's stipend had an aspect of fixed assets. (Sakamoto 1991, p.154)

7 Although Nitobe used *bushido*'s terms in his popular essays in the late Meiji and early Taisho periods, his purpose was not to revive the samurai's honorific individualism in the present society. Rather, he attempted to introduce Christian individualism that comes from the connection to the religious absolute, as I will examine later.

8 See chapter 2 of Sonoda et al. (1995)

9 Recalling his college life at Tokyo Imperial University where Nitobe taught economics, Hyoe Ouchi remarks as follows, 'Professor Nitobe said in his seminar, 'You have to read Adam Smith at least once while you are in this university.' At that time, I could not understand what he meant. Now, [I think that] it is evidence that he was a great scholar, for Adam Smith was a scholar who was the most contemptible and should be ignored, because liberalism was regarded as a wrong theory and wrong type of individualism" (Ouchi 1960, p.22). Nitobe, in a lecture from 1933, explains his theory of new liberalism as follows: "The new liberalism respects freedom of individuals. However, it requires people to abstain from freedom that harms their neighbors. Individual freedom is quite simple in that it opens a way in which individuals follow their own interests and, as Charter Oath says, opens a way in which we can obtain what we want" (Nitobe 1933, p.212). See also Yammaoto (2017) for Nitobe's new liberalism.

10 Several studies have examined Nitobe's *heimindo*, such as Takeda (1965); Oshiro (1992, pp.145-160); Uchikawa (2002); Furuya (2004); and Taniguchi (2015, pp.77-81). These articles and books regard *heimindo* as a modern version of *bushido*. I also examined his *heimindo* and his view on democracy in Yamamoto (2012).

11 Mitani notes that Yoshino Sakuzo regarded democracy as a political matter, unlike Nitobe.

12 This collection was also published in Japanese in 1909 as "Taisei Shiso no Eikyo." The Japanese version can be found in volume 21 of *Nitobe Inazo Zenshu* (Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 1986).

13 Pocock pointed out that "Burke is asserting that commerce is dependent upon manners, and not the other way round; a civilized society is the prerequisite of exchange relations, and the latter alone cannot create the former. The political economists (or 'oeconomical politicians'), the historians of Scottish school, had as we have seen recognized clerical learning and feudal chivalry as preconditions of the growth of commerce; but Hume, Robertson, Smith, Millar — we may add Gibbon — had all isolated the growth of exchange, production and diversified labour as the motor force which create the growth of manners, culture and enlightenment. Burke characteristically regards this as preposterous, as mistaking the effect for the cause" (Pocock 1985, p.199).


15 See Lecky (1876). Nitobe also uses "veracity" for *makoto* in *Bushido*.

16 Nitobe also devoted himself to educating young leaders as a principal of the First High School
(which later became a part of Tokyo University). However, he did not use terms from *bushido* when he talked to students. I examined the reason in Yamamoto (2015a).

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